The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has uncovered an emerging crowdfunding network being used to raise and move money for terrorist activities in Nigeria, including through bank accounts registered to dead persons.
The financial intelligence agency also flagged accounts registered in women’s names and phone numbers linked to third parties as methods used by terrorist financiers to hide the movement of illicit funds.
The findings appear in the NFIU’s 2025 Annual Report, which examined emerging trends in terrorist financing and other financial crimes during the year.
According to the report, the network is run by foreign-based facilitators who use social media to solicit donations disguised as humanitarian relief or educational support, spreading payment links through encrypted messaging platforms such as Telegram and Signal.
Hundreds of sympathisers may donate between $50 and $500 each, amounts small enough to avoid triggering most automated anti-money laundering alerts.
The funds are then pooled into a “master account” controlled by a senior network member based abroad. Once the pool reaches a certain threshold, the NFIU said, that account becomes the hub for moving the money onward into Nigeria.
Money Mules And Fractured Payments Used To Dodge Detection
The agency said the pooled funds are then split into many smaller payments and sent through International Money Transfer Operators (IMTOs) and remittance apps to a network of money mules in Nigeria, including students, small-business owners and relatives.
“Rather than sending one large transfer, the senior member fractures the funds and sends dozens of sub-threshold payments through IMTOs and remittance apps to a network of money mules in Nigeria; students, small-business owners, or relatives, avoiding reporting triggers,” the report said.
Recipients may convert the funds into cash, use them to buy dual-use items such as motorcycles, fertilisers and satellite internet equipment, or move the money through mobile banking to logistics managers and field operatives — a stage the NFIU calls the “integration” of funds into terrorist financing.
Women’s Accounts Used As Fronts For Male Commanders
The report identifies gender-based proxy accounts as another growing tactic.
The NFIU said terrorist financiers open accounts in women’s names while male commanders or logistics managers secretly control them, exploiting cultural norms that make women less likely to draw suspicion from authorities.
“This tactic functions as identity laundering: women’s accounts are managed by men who hold ATM cards, mobile-banking credentials, and PINs, while the women often remain unaware of the transactions and volumes,” the report stated.
The agency further flagged the use of phone numbers not registered to the true account holder, including SIM cards registered to deceased people or gender-based proxies, to break the link between bank accounts, SIM cards and Bank Verification Numbers (BVNs) and keep facilitators anonymous when transactions are flagged.
ISWAP’s Coded And “Bureaucratic” Transaction Trails
The report also details methods used by terrorist cells, particularly those linked to the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), to organise or disguise financial transactions.
Some cells reportedly use precise, professional-sounding transaction descriptions as an internal accounting system, functioning almost like a bureaucracy in which field commanders must justify expenses to central controllers.
Other facilitators, the NFIU said, use coded language, innocuous words or alphanumeric strings, and sometimes switch languages, to evade bank filters that flag terms such as “Jihad,” “Arms” or “Boko.”
Beyond terrorist financing, the NFIU said its 2025 risk analysis found an increasingly connected threat environment involving financial crime, technology and cross-border activity.
Fraud remained a dominant offence, with growth in Ponzi schemes, fraudulent crowdfunding, cryptocurrency-linked investment scams and hacking-related fraud, including compromised social media accounts.
The agency said criminals are increasingly exploiting gaps in fintech onboarding, including tiered accounts with minimal identification requirements, while digital platforms allow them to recruit victims and move funds quickly.
It also flagged the diversion of state and local government funds through accounts belonging to finance officers, weak procurement oversight, and heavy cash use that complicates tracing illicit assets.
The NFIU said its findings have been converted into targeted advisories and intelligence products for security agencies, banks and policymakers.






