General Yakubu Gowon on Unity, Civil War, and Nigeria’s Future: Reflections from a Former Head of State

Gen Yakubu Dan-Yumma “Jack” Gowon was a Nigerian former Head of State and statesman who led the Federal military government during the bloody Nigerian-Biafran Civil War. He delivered the famous “no victor, no vanquished” speech to promote healing and reconciliation. Gowon, an Anglican Christian, is accused of crimes against humanity and genocide but maintains his leadership saved the country. Gowon served as Nigeria’s longest continuous head of state, ruling for nearly nine years until his overthrow in 1975.

He has just turned 90, having been born October 19, 1934. He continues to be celebrated by many Nigerians. In this rare interview, he shares his own narrative of the events of the epoch period of Nigeria’s history. A careful reading of this interview will elucidate the minds of scholars of history even more.

The Interview

Q You are committed to Nigeria’s unity; how did you take it when the civil war broke out?

Ans “I grew up with other Nigerians in a little village called Wusasa. It is a Hausa community, but honestly, we knew one another. We either attended church together, or if you were a Muslim, you would go to mosque together, whether you were Hausa, Yoruba, or whatever. The unity of this country is certainly something for me.

I have always said that if there was no secession, there wouldn’t be a breakout, and there wouldn’t be a question of civil war because it got to the stage where it was getting pretty clear that a part of the country, the South East, wanted to secede.

My duty and profession at the time demanded that we keep the country together, and that is how it happened.

I experienced a crisis in some African countries, especially the Congo. I served twice in the Congo and saw the brutality and suffering of the people, but little did I know that a few years later, I would face the same problem. We had to do whatever we could to keep the country together.

“The unity of this country is certainly something for me.”

I can assure you that it was not done out of joy but to ensure that we would at least be able to live together after resolving the problem. That was what we did.

The soldiers were given a list of dos and don’ts, like all the Geneva Convention instructions in any international conflict. There were about 12 conditions, such as not fighting against older adults, women, children, etc. It was only against those who took up arms against you; that’s all. Unfortunately, it happened.

Q If given another opportunity, what would you have done differently?

Ans “I wouldn’t have done anything differently. Every effort was made to ensure the situation did not degenerate into a breakaway. I had a duty to ensure that the country’s breakup did not happen. We had to fight for two and a half years and made sure that there was no interference from outside. There was no question of allowing any nation or power to get involved in our crisis. If you remember, in the Congo, you had United Nations forces made up of Nigerian troops and others from other parts of Africa to deal with the problem. 

At least we were able to deal with that problem and ensure our ability to live again as a people. So, I couldn’t have done it differently.

Q There are still agitations in the South-east for the Republic of Biafra. Does it mean that the three Rs declared after the civil war failed to make any impact? What is your message to the people of that region? 

Ans “The Rs stand for reconciliation, rehabilitation, reintegration, and, of course, reconstruction.

I instructed the fighting troops after the war, ‘ Having fought your brothers and sisters, I want you to be soldiers of peace. Do whatever you can to help them get back to their homes and places, and give whatever assistance to them.’ 

“If there was no secession, there wouldn’t be a breakout, and there wouldn’t be a question of civil war.”

Despite what happened, many courageous Igbo people who lived in the North went back to Kaduna, Kano, Jos, etc., and got back their properties, which some of their friends had kept for them. They got them back almost immediately. The troops helped to transport them to various parts of the country.

There was no question of trial. Everyone was allowed to go back if they wished. But I gave special instructions to soldiers, especially officers because they knew that they should not have gone against the government. That was where a few retirements were made.

I had Mr Ukpabi Asika, a brilliant nationalist, as administrator and gave him all the assistance he needed. For example, we offered help to get the schools going. There was also the medical side, etc. Many things were done so that you could start reconciling and integrating people back to various parts of the country. 

In my message for the people of the Southeast, I would say that the civil war has ended, and the Republic of Biafra is no more because people have accepted to be reintegrated as Nigerians. Do you want me to say they should continue? No. Don’t ask that question. 

Q At the end of the Civil War, Newsweek magazine described you as the equivalent of Abraham Lincoln of the United States.  What do you say to that?

Ans “I remember this question about comparing me with Abraham Lincoln. I remember that during the time, somebody called Mr Martin Dent and gave me a book about the American Civil War, but because of what was happening, I had no time to read it until towards the end. 

When I read that book, I thought what was happening in Nigeria was like the American Civil War. It was so uncanny.

If I had read that book before we prosecuted the Nigerian Civil War, if anybody had said that I was trying to make myself look like Abraham Lincoln, I would have found it difficult to say there was no comparison between us.  The only difference was that at the end of it, I could continue with the reconciliation and getting the country through. So, sometimes I say to myself that I don’t mind being called the Abraham Lincoln of Nigeria because we had a similar situation, and we were able to achieve the same result. 

“I instructed the fighting troops after the war, ‘Having fought your brothers and sisters, I want you to be soldiers of peace.'”

I remember that one English journalist asked why I thought the war was over —what if the people continued with guerrilla warfare? But thank God there was no guerrilla.  

Let me deviate. I thank God that when the war ended, I did not capture Chief Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu because I would have probably found it challenging to handle public opinion that would have encouraged me to deal with him. This is because I knew that I would have done everything to save his life. But would it be the same thing if it was the reverse?

Q We heard many versions of what transpired between you and Ojukwu in Aburi, Ghana. We want to hear from the horse’s mouth. What happened? Did you agree to a confederation?

Ans “Ojukwu used to say, ‘On Aburi we stand,’ and I would say, ‘From Aburi you will fall.‘

The story of Aburi is that we had been trying everything to be able to meet in Nigeria to resolve all the unfortunate things that happened – the killings and all the katakata after the January 15 coup. I was to go to Ibadan the following day, but I was informed that I could not go because there was a reception for officers coming into the brigade – officers like me being posted to that brigade and others from the brigade being posted out. There was a reception by the brigade commander for officers like me and others, and I had to attend that Friday night to ensure that I did the correct thing in that unit. So, that evening, I went to the reception, and when it ended, I moved to Ikeja to stay for the night. 

Unfortunately, late that night, there was commotion. I was wondering what it was, but nobody told me anything. And I was to take over the battalion the following morning. Then, troops and vehicles were moved into the unit. After some time, it died down. But after another two to three hours, there was greater movement and commotion, and I wondered what was happening. A beagle was calling all the troops to a master parade. I was wondering and looking through the window to see what was happening.  Luckily, I saw one of the officers, the adjutant of the unit, Captain Martin Ademo, now late. He later became a General. I saw him passing by the duplex, a temporary quarter I was to stay in since the commanding officer’s residence was not ready yet for occupation.

I asked what was happening, but he wouldn’t say anything, so I decided to go down and find out. When I met him and asked what the commotion was about, he told General Aguiyi Ironsi, who was the General Officer Commanding (GOC), came and told them that there was some crisis in town affecting the prime minister, Tafawa Balewa and Okotie Eboh, the finance minister. He had come to seek some assistance to see if he could deal with the problem. My first reaction was: Why Ironsi? Why not the brigadier because the chain of command should have come through him? Ironsi should have told the brigadier, who would have related to the battalion commander. 

However, I asked where he was, and he said he was at the master parade area. So I had to change into civil clothes to see what was happening. When we got there, he briefed me, saying that he wanted some units to be prepared so that they could deal with the situation. When he finished, he asked if there were questions. 

I did not know that by that time, all the senior officers from my school —Maimalari, Kur Mohammed, Abo Baladinma, Yakubu Pam – had been killed. One of my good friends, Arthur Unegbe, from Ozobulu, was also killed, and I didn’t know.

I went, and I got the Quarter Master to get me some military uniforms, boots, hats, etc, and I went into town. Luckily enough, we were able to deal with the coup in Lagos. But in Kaduna, they succeeded in killing the premier, his wife, and other officials. They were undoubtedly in command, but at least in Lagos, the headquarters where we were in charge. I was able to get all the other units to make sure that at least they did not go along with what had just happened. That was how I got involved. I tried to get things under control.

However, it reached a stage when the leadership could not do anything to fix things. We tried to see if we could meet within the country. 

Of course, Ojukwu said that, given what happened, he could not be sure of his safety. He asked if we could also meet at the East or Mid-West, which was neutral since the whole thing seemed to be North versus East.

We got one of the British Airways aircraft or one of the British naval ships to meet us in the air or on one of the British naval ships. Every effort was made, both by Nigerians and the British, for us to meet, but in the end, we had to agree to meet in Aburi. That was where it all started.

I think we went there in early January. As far as I am concerned, we were going for that meeting so that we could agree as military officers.

“I don’t mind being called the Abraham Lincoln of Nigeria because we had a similar situation and achieved a similar result.”

I did not take my secretary to the government and officials like advisers when I went. But of course, Ojukwu had a different intention, so he came with all his advisers and prepared a memorandum, which he wanted to solve the problem as if we were to make an agreement in class. I said no. 

I joked with him and said he came with a pink solution paper. At our training in senior courses, students wrote on a white paper, but the staff had another green paper or something, and the solution paper was usually pink. 

He read all the conditions and things he wanted done from his paper, and we discussed them. We spent two days there. When we got back, we agreed that I would make a statement on the areas we agreed on.

Unfortunately, I was down with a very serious fever, and honestly, I could not do anything. As soon as Ojukwu got back, he made a statement on what was agreed upon. I had not seen the document he was using. He said we had agreed to part or something like that. Early in the morning, David Ejoor called to tell me what Ojukwu had done (I was still on a sickbed).

I asked if that was what we agreed to, and he said no. That was how the confusion started. Of course, when I got better, we disagreed because that was not the agreement. We were going to discuss most of these things in Nigeria; however, that did not happen, so we had to ensure that something was done. 

Ojukwu then started doing all sorts of things, including disobeying the federal government’s instructions, taking over the government’s revenue, all the rolling stock from Port Harcourt, and hijacking the Nigerian Airways’ aircraft.

A lot was happening. Security-wise, people were disappearing, etc., and the fault was put on northern soldiers. The information was that there were some elements of recruitment at that time. Some bad eggs were using the opportunity of being in the military to settle scores. 

Ojukwu said his Constituent Assembly said he could break away to form Biafra.

“I can say with absolute authority that I may not have anything today, but I have a clear conscience.”

From some of the intelligence I was receiving, it was just a step to the next thing. That was when I created a state of emergency and 12 states to make sure that no region in Nigeria was marginalized because there was the fear of the monolithic North. The minority group in the East, Biriye, Briggs, and others, did not want to go along with the agreement given to Ojukwu. They came to me several times. I created 12 states to ensure that no place is too big or too strong to threaten the country’s unity.

Lagos State comprised Lagos Central, Epe, Ikeja, and Badagry, which were created so that the old colony of Lagos could become a state of its own. That was probably one of the reasons that after the civil war, the security situation made us think of establishing a new capital in Abuja so that at least the federal government and the state would not stay in one place. We knew that Lagos was going to remain the commercial capital of the country and the engineer of national activities.

Shagari was my commissioner for finance, and one of the instructions I left for him was that when they were doing the budget, he should make sure that he had some money kept for planning and building the infrastructure of the future capital of Nigeria in Abuja.

It’s not that I didn’t want to return the country to democracy, but when I was about to do it, politicians started fighting. You can remember the popular statement, “If you Tarka me, I Dabo you, if you Dabo me, I Tarka you.”

I did not want a situation reflecting what happened before the first coup. 

I don’t know what version you heard, but in the end, we had to meet in Benin, with all the governors and me at the time, to discuss the Aburi agreement and put it in the proper context. We invited Ojukwu to be there, but he did not come. The only thing I included, which probably made him not accept it, was that there was no chance for any part of the country to secede without the agreement of two-thirds of the members of the group.  But as soon as we left, Ejoor told me that Ojukwu had come to find out what it was.

Q You presided over Nigeria when the country’s economy was very good. Did you use the money judiciously? How do you reconcile the story that you left penniless when your government was overthrown?

Ans “Did I leave penniless? Mr Goodheart, the British parliamentarian, said that when I left Nigeria, I took half of the Central Bank of Nigeria.

Yes, we had a lot of money. We ensured we did not destroy any of the facilities during the civil war. We did whatever we could not to damage our oil infrastructure. So, soon after the civil war, they were able to come back, and we could have a reasonable amount of money. And there was discipline in my government. I can tell you that any fund I ever held as head of state was roughly 83,000 pounds. That was before we changed to the naira for security reasons. I was forced to do it for the sake of Nigeria.

All we did was in the public interest. I know I was accused of helping certain countries like Grenada and Barbados, but we did the same thing in West Africa, too. We helped as much as we could, even at home.

I can say with absolute authority that I may not have anything today, but I have a clear conscience. I thank Idi Amin and Eyadema for helping me have money to start with. 

Q You had hints that you would be overthrown, but you didn’t do anything about it; why?

Ans “Who said I didn’t do anything about it? When the security details told me that something like that would happen, the only two names I was given were people who were supposed to be very close to me – my commander, brigade of guards, Joe Garba, and Tony Ochefu. Both of them were from my state, Benue-Plateau. Of course, I had to be suspicious of those two names. They were from my state and also Christians, so I could not believe it. Despite every effort I made, I tried to get Ochefu but could not. And Joe Garba swore by heaven and earth.

These people had helped me ensure that the country was one of those I trusted. I had to go to Kampala for a meeting. I was the one who made sure that most of the countries attended the meeting of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) so that we could deal with the problem of Africa. As chairman of the OAU, I encouraged most leaders to come so that we could discuss the remaining colonial problems in Africa. We tried to do that, and people attended. 

I was discussing with the governor who accompanied me to Kampala, the commissioner of police, Farouk Usman, that if the coup happened, as far as I was concerned, it would not create any problem. As far as I was concerned, we would see what happened. I hoped that if God had preserved us and we could make it to the 10th year, I would probably have done something about coups and countercoups in Nigeria. That was my prayer. 

I usually attend meetings on time, but Mobutu wanted to see me. I am sure he must have heard about the coup already. I got to the conference late, and as I entered, Idi Amin, the chairman, called me. Mr. Mbo, a Cameroonian and the head of the education sector at United Nations Education was giving his speech.

When I went to Idi Amin, he showed me a Reuters slip, and I saw the news that my government had been overthrown. I said I hadn’t heard anything. My high commission had not contacted me to tell me anything, so that might be a rumor.  Soon after, when that was being done, I whispered to Farouk that the issue we were discussing on the flight to Kampala and what we were afraid of had happened, but he didn’t quite get it. I didn’t seem worried at all, but you could see the worry in Farouk’s face. 

That event almost killed the OAU meeting because others started going back. So, I left the meeting place, went to my hotel, and later exercised and played tennis. Honestly, my interest was in Nigeria continuing. 

The following day, I had to give a world press conference. I remember that during my school days at Barewa College in Zaria, we read Shakespeare, who said, “The world is a stage, and all the men and women are merely players. They have their exits and entrances, and one man plays many parts in his time.”

“Every government has a responsibility to make the country good for every citizen and every part of it.“

I didn’t go beyond that because if I did, some of you press people would say he wanted to return. When I got to that,I said, “Ladies and gentlemen of the press, this is my exit, and all I want you to do is give Nigeria the support you gave me so that the country will progress. That was that.

I went to the United Kingdom to become a student, which they didn’t like because I was taking my tray to get my breakfast.

When I came back, and we were going through all the crises, since I could not physically do anything, we formed an organization called Nigeria Prays to pray for peace, stability, and well-being in Nigeria. Every Nigerian means something to me, so I thought we needed to pray to God to help us. 

What is happening in Nigeria today would make you sad, but let us not give up on praying and ensuring we believe in God. 

If you remember, we had a development plan. We started the iron and steel company in Ajaokuta, the petrochemicals in Enugu, and the LNG. I was to sign the memorandum of understanding for the LNG to start building four times the size of what was there. We had lots of development—things like Peugeot in Kaduna, Volkswagen was supposed to be in Lagos, then, of course, Steyr in Bauchi, Leylands in Ibadan, and I think Volkswagen in Enugu.

Q Looking at the situation in Nigeria, what is your advice to the current administration? 

Ans “Every government has a responsibility to make the country good for every citizen and every part of it.“

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